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	3	Filed <u>JUL 2 2 1999</u> JOSE O. GUILLEN	
		Court Executive Officer	
	4	J. FLOHR Deputy	
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10	COUNTY OF NAPA		
11	PAH/STANLY RANCH, LLC,	1	
		Court No. 26-04804	
12		STATEMENT OF DECISION DENYING	
13	VS.	PETITION FOR WRIT OF	
14	COUNTY OF NAPA, et al.,	ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS	
15	Respondents.		
16	THIS MATTER came on regularly for hearing on 23 June 1999. Petitioner PAH/		
17	STANLY RANCH, LLC, appeared by CHEVALIER, ALLEN & LICHMAN, LLP, by		
18	BARBARA E. LICHMAN, Ph.D., ESQ., and by DICKENSON, PEATMAN & FOGARTY, by		
19	PAUL G. CAREY, ESQ., its attorneys of record.		
20	Respondents COUNTY OF NAPA and NAPA COUNTY AIRPORT LAND USE		
21	COMMISSION appeared by ROBERT WEST GUTE		
22	COMMISSION appeared by ROBERT WESTMEYER, County Counsel, by LAURA J. ANDERSON, ESQ., their attorney of record.		
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24	Amicus curiae CALIFORNIA PILOTS ASSOCIATION and NAPA AIRPORT PILOTS		
	ASSOCIATION appeared by JAY C. WHITE, ESQ., their attorney of record.		
25	On 7 July 1999 the court rendered its TENTATIVE DECISION DENYING PETITION		
26	OR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS, and directed that counsel for respondent		
27	prepare a PROPOSED STATEMENT OF DECIS	repare a PROPOSED STATEMENT OF DECISION. That was accomplished and the	
28	document served by mail on 12 July 1999.	cument served by mail on 12 July 1999.	
29	On 15 July 1999 petitioner filed its STATEMENT OF CONTROVERTED ISSUES;		
	CONTROVERTED ISSUES;		
	. 1		

PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENT OF TENTATIVE DECISION AND FOR CONTENT OF STATEMENT OF DECISION; AND REQUEST FOR HEARING.

On 21 July 1999 respondent filed its RESPONDENT'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S STATEMENT OF CONTROVERTED ISSUES; PETITIONER'S PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENT OF TENTATIVE DECISION AND FOR CONTENT OF STATEMENT OF DECISION AND PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR HEARING.

The court has reviewed and considered the entire Administrative Record. The court has also considered the submissions of counsel, their arguments, and has reviewed the citations proffered. The court has also reviewed and considered the submissions of the parties after the TENTATIVE DECISION DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS. The court is satisfied that all issues are well and truly before the court, and that no further hearing is necessary before the court may issue its STATEMENT OF DECISIION DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS.

GOOD CAUSE APPEARING the court makes its STATEMENT OF DECISION DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS as follows:

At the time of hearing, number of preliminary items were addressed before counsel argued the issues. First, pursuant to agreement of counsel, respondent COUNTY OF NAPA was ordered DISMISSED, without prejudice, from this proceeding. The action is thus directed only to respondent NAPA COUNTY AIRPORT LAND USE COMMISSION.

Second, petitioner submitted and requested that additional exhibits (numbers 29, 30, 31, 33, 36 and 39) be made a part of the Administrative Record. After argument petitioner agreed to withdraw exhibits 33 and 39. The court then ruled that exhibits 29, 30 and 31 would not be made a part of the Administrative Record; and that exhibit 36, the Airport Master Plan, would be made a part of the Administrative Record.

BACKGROUND

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Petitioner went through the process of preparing draft and final Environmental Impact Reports for its proposed housing, resort and golf development south of the City of Napa (hereafter "City"), but within City limits and within the County Rural-Urban Limit line. The City, as it must, referred the development to the Airport Land Use Commission (hereafter

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"ALUC") because the development is within the Airport Land Use Plan (hereafter "ALUP") area.
The ALUP designates areas surrounding the airport into Zones on an apparently arbitrary scale of
Compatibility from A through F, in descending order of interference with, or from, the airport
operations.

The Stanly Ranch Specific Plan cannot be approved unless it is either consistent with the ALUP, or a finding of inconsistency is overridden by the referring City. The ALUC staffs report on the development recommended a finding of consistency. However, the final decision by the ALUC was that the project is inconsistent.

There were four reasons why the ALUC found the project not to be consistent. These findings which petitioner argues are unsupported by substantial evidence are contained in Exhibit 28 of the Administrative Record. They are as follows:

 "Design Guidelines of the Specific Plan (page A-15) propose certain *uplighting* of landscaping, signage, walls and sculpture. Policy 3.3.5 of the ALUP prohibits the establishment of glare in any airport planning area. The Commission finds that the proposed uplighting may produce glare that may be distracting to the operators of aircraft, and therefore the Specific Plan is **INCONSISTENT** with the ALUP.

2. The Specific Plan proposes to locate four of five residential neighborhoods, and the employee housing complex, in Compatibility Zone E beneath overflight patterns published by IASCO/JAL for twin engine and Bonanza A-36 aircraft operating at Napa County Airport. Pursuant to Note 7 of Table 3-2 of the ALUP, the location of residential land uses should consider the proximity of flight patterns, frequency of overflight, terrain conditions and types of aircraft. The Commission found that federally mandated flight altitudes applicable to Napa County Airport as an 'uncongested area' may be as low as 500 ft. above the ground in the location of Stanly Ranch, and that no altitude standards are mandated for aircraft engaged in instrument landings. The Commission finds that because Specific Plan residential locations do not appear to consider flight patterns or the frequency of overflight that the Specific Plan is therefore INCONSISTENT with the ALUP.

3. The Specific Plan proposes clustered residential development within Compatibility Zone

E, as close as approximately 100 ft. from that zone's boundary with Compatibility Zone D, with 550 of the Plan's proposed 594 residential units within Zone E, and only 44 residential units, a winery/wine center, and a resort hotel located within Zone F. Pursuant to Policy 3.1.2 of the ALUP, the designation of land uses with respect to noise exposure should evaluate site conditions, terrain, flight patterns, and flight frequency. The Commission finds that the location and density of the Stanly Ranch employee housing complex is too close to Zone D in view of the noise produced by climbing patterns and full-power overflights above that area, and that consideration of relative noise exposure would suggest that all residential uses be located farther from the airport, and commercial/resort uses be located closer to the airport than proposed. For these reasons, the Commission finds the Stanly Ranch Specific Plan INCONSISTENT with the ALUP. 4. The Specific Plan proposes to locate 594 permanent residential units at the Stanly Ranch. ALUP discussion of Overflight Compatibility concerns (page 2-7) indicates that 'the most effective means of achieving compatibility is to prevent the encroachment of residential uses beneath the flight patterns. 'While is possible that 'community goals [may] dictate the need for residential uses within an airport's traffic area.' Since the City of Napa has failed to demonstrate a need for residential development on the Stanly Ranch where Napa County Airport aircraft are routinely engaged in overflight, the Commission finds the Specific Plan to be **INCONSISTENT** with the ALUP."

Petitioner also argues that it was denied appropriate procedural due process during the proceedings before the Commission.

Respondent argues that this entire proceeding is mooted by the anticipated action of the Napa City Council which indicated its decision to override ALUC's determination of inconsistency in order to approve the project subject to voter acceptance at election.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of the court's review is based on ALUC's decision being quasiadjudicatory. That is, where an agency applies general policies to a particular situation, the decision is quasi-adjudicatory. In this situation, the general policy is ALUP, and of course the specific situation is the Stanly Ranch Specific Plan. The court must decide if ALUC abused its

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Therefore, the standard is, whether ALUC's decision is supported by substantial (defined 2 as being of ponderable legal significance, solid, credible, in light of the entire record, not isolated bits, and not speculative, or based on unsubstantiated opinion or clearly erroneous) evidence, and the agency proceeded according to law. The court may not substitute its own judgment for ALUC's, and any conflicts must be resolved in favor of ALUC. Sequoyah Hills Homeowners Assn. v. City of Oakland (1993) 23 Cal.App.4th 704, 719.

This is therefore a deferential standard. A single finding that is supported by substantial 8 evidence is sufficient to uphold ALUC's conclusion of inconsistency. The court should be able 9 to find the evidence without having to "grope through" the record. Topanga Association for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506. The Specific Plan under consideration must generally be in harmony, even if all aspects are not precisely consistent with, the General Plan.

Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Aubry (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 861, 868.

The court will review the arguments of the parties and its intended rulings below, in the same order as the findings. Thereafter the court will address the issues of procedural due process.

The issue of mootness was tossed into a cocked hat at the Napa City Council meeting of 6 July 1999¹, and so the court will defer decision on this issue until another day.

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UPLIGHTING

Petitioner's Argument:

Oddly, petitioner does not attack Finding #1, except in a footnote that derides this finding as "to [sic] ludicrous to address", that lights from the project will be distracting to pilots. Petitioner seems to urge that the lighting objected to is merely soft illumination for foliage, to shadow a tree against a fence, for signage, and is not directed overhead. This kind of lighting is so much less than that from a city that it can't be seen to be a distraction.

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¹ See Napa Valley Register of 7 July 1999, "Stanly Ranch project dead."

Respondent's Response:

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Respondent of course views this concession as dispositive, arguing that this unattacked finding is the "single finding" needed for the court to uphold ALUC's finding of inconsistency. The view that interference is problematic is supported by the staff report that alluded to possible interference, and a Commissioner with 44 years' flying experience that spoke of light pollution and lighting problems for pilots. Amicus points out that the ALUP Handbook notes that lighting is a factor to be considered.

ALUC exists in important part to control interference with an airport. It is hard to quantify interference such as noise, so a basic function of ALUC is to prevent encroachment of residential uses below flight patterns. If encroachment cannot be prevented, an ALUC must decide if community goals for increased housing outweigh the goal of minimizing interference. It is admitted here that the airport's flight patterns lie over Stanly Ranch.

Petitioner's Reply:

Petitioner again urges that the Administrative Record provides absolutely no evidence of lighting problems. The finding is argued to be solely the result of Commissioner Kangas's baseless fears.

Ruling:

The court concludes that the Administrative Record does contain important reference to 18 "uplighting". (AR 082; 0136; 0152) While the Stanly Ranch Specific Plan says that lighting will 19 be designed not to interfere with what is clearly vehicular traffic, the Stanley Ranch Specific Plan 20 does not make the same promise as to aircraft. The staff report said that placing smaller 21 streetlights, as provided for in the Stanly Ranch Specific Plan, only partially implements the 22 ALUP goal of reducing glare. (AR 010; 011) The court concludes that it is entirely proper that a 23 Commissioner with 44 years of flying experience worry about uplighting, and find that it is not adequately addressed in the Stanley Ranch Specific Plan.

The court first concludes that this finding is supported by substantial evidence, and that the petition should be denied.

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LOW FLIGHT ALLOWED

Petitioner's Argument:

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Petitioner notes that the Stanley Ranch Specific Plan makes all Zone D land open space, in conformity with the ALUP. Residential land use designations are all in Zones E and F, which is likewise consistent with the ALUP. This, it is argued, is all that is required.

There was no evidence in the Administrative Record that the aircraft that use the airport (at least the IASCO/JAL single engine A-36 and the twin engine C-90) fly at less than 1000 feet above ground level (AGL) over the residential areas of the project. Commissioner Collinson jumped to the conclusion that since the project "visualizes" part of the area as non-congested, Federal Aviation Regulations might allow flights down to 500 feet, and therefore there would be interference.

There is no definition of "congested" or "uncongested". In fact, the project's land use in 12 this area would definitely be "congested", forbidding flights at less than 1000 feet AGL. 13 Commissioner Collinson was also wrong when he said the residential area would be under the 14 "base leg" for takeoff and landing. It's not. It is instead under the downwind leg where 1000-foot altitude is required. IASCO pilots of the C-90's do not descend below 1000 AGL feet until they cross State Route 29, which is well north of the project's residential neighborhoods. The A-36 does not descend below 1000 feet until the extreme northern end of the project area.

The evidence does not support the basis for the finding that "instrument landings" which 19 have no altitude minimums might take place. This appears only three times in the record. Annie 20 Donahue, not a pilot, made this unsupported, speculative suggestion. Commissioner Kangas, a 21 purported pilot, made the same suggestion but had no evidence on which to base his remark, 22 ALUP itself says that these instrument landings take place only in Zone D, not in Zone E. The process would have been well served, it is argued, if the Commissioners had read their own ALUP.

Respondent's Response:

The Commission found that since the area is designated as "uncongested", federal rules 27 permit flying as low as 500 feet AGL, or less for instrument landings. Employee housing in 28 Zone E could be overflown at this altitude. The Commission concluded that the Stanly Ranch 29

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StanlylRanch #ALU-143 ALUC 3-5-03 Specific Plan didn't take into account flight patterns or overflight frequency, and therefore was inconsistent with ALUP.

It is not true that all ALUP demands is that housing not be built in Zones A through D. ALUC has discretion to determine whether housing in any zone is or is not consistent with ALUP. In fact, ALUP says that as to Zones E and F housing must be considered in relation to flight patterns, frequency of overflight, terrain conditions and type of aircraft. A developer may not place housing anywhere in Zones E and F. Rather, ALUC may determine if housing clusters within these zones is consistent. Here, the proposed clustering places housing directly below flight patterns, contrary to the letter and spirit of ALUP. Proposed avigation easements may reduce, but would certainly not eliminate, noise complaints.

ALUC, not petitioner, is responsible for determining interference. While the Stanly Ranch Specific Plan prepared by petitioner said that everything was appropriate and acceptable, that is not a determination that petitioner may make.

A JAL flight instructor said that the Bonanza aircraft traffic pattern put flights directly over Stanly Ranch. Traffic for Runway 18R, the one most utilized for training, is directly over Stanly Ranch residential area.

The Napa Pilot's Association presented testimony that proposed homes lie directly under the traffic pattern for 18R, the busiest runway. Airplanes will be only 600-1000 feet above houses that are on a knoll 75-foot in elevation.

Contrary to petitioner's view, pilots descend while on the downwind leg for landing. This descent allows a pilot to disregard the prohibition against descending below 1000 feet of the highest obstacle within 2000 feet of the aircraft. Since the knoll is on the downwind leg, a pilot may fly under 1000 feet above the houses on the knoll. This leg is directly above the residential portion of Stanly Ranch

Even if JAL pilots do not operate below 1000 feet above the residential areas, other pilots may routinely do so. Flights under 1000 feet AGL are permitted because the area is designated as "uncongested".

Petitioner's Reply:

The residential portions of Stanly Ranch are in Zone E, not Zone D. In Zone E, aircraft

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will be operating only above 1000 feet AGL.

Additionally, it is not ALUC which must take into consideration the interference, but the 2 City, which is responsible for the creation of general plans. Land planning is controlled by the 3 City, not by ALUC. The right to locate homes in the various Zones is entirely a City decision. The argument that the General Plan doesn't have placement of housing for Stanly Ranch, and therefore ALUC may make the decision is wrong. This decision is to be made either by the General Plan or Specific Plan, not by ALUC. This ill-considered conclusion by ALUC does not merit the court's deference.

Ruling:

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A deferential court is unlikely to overturn an administrative decision unless there is 10 essentially so little evidence to support the decision that it is apparent other considerations or 11 pressures prevailed, or that the procedure was deficient as a matter of law. Here, respondent 12 points to the possibility of low flights, and the future possible development of the airport. ALUP 13 does not say that a developer has a free hand in developing all land outside Zones A-D, but that 14 residential housing is prohibited in these Zones. There is nothing in ALUP, which states that 15 ALUC may not restrict development in Zones E and F. A finding that housing in Zone E is too 16 close to Zone D is not irrational, and is here supported by evidence.

While it is true that the City through its General Plan and Stanly Ranch through the 18 Specific Plan ultimately control where housing will be placed, Petitioner's argument would act to strip an ALUC of its power to ensure that development near an airport is compatible with the airport. The City retains the power to overturn ALUC through an override. That doesn't mean that ALUC doesn't have the power to determine inconsistency, even if the development of housing is outside Zones A-D.

There is also evidence that the housing is below flight patterns, including traffic patterns for Runway 18R. (AR: 012; 015, 017; 0439-440; 0222), and that homes might be only 600-1000 feet below the aircraft.

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The court concludes that, as to this issue, the petition should be denied.

ZONE E RESIDENCES TOO CLOSE TO ZONE D

Petitioner's Argument:

Noise levels are highest near State Route 29; not the employee housing that is nearest Zone D. As long as housing is in Zone E, it is acceptable, according to ALUP.

There is no evidence that there are climbing patterns and full power overflights over residential portions of Zone E, except Citizen Bailey's unsupported testimony. There couldn't be, because due to prevailing winds, the area is in the approach path, not departure path. During the rare shift of wind, overflights will not be over Stanly Ranch.

Any "flip" of project housing would cause more noise interference, and not less. The evidence shows that while aircraft noise in Zones E and F is insignificant, noise from State Route 29 is not. "Flipping" would put houses nearer State Route 29, therefore this would increase noise in residential areas.

Respondent's Response:

ALUC found the Stanly Ranch Specific Plan inconsistent because residential housing would be located within 100 feet of Zone D. Additionally, 550 houses are in Zone E and only 44 in Zone F. ALUC decided that residential uses should be farther from, and commercial uses closer to, the airport. Since this wasn't done, ALUC made a finding of inconsistency.

Annoyance, as ALUC found, is difficult to measure, and varies between individuals. ALUC therefore considered letters from residents of Milton Road, which is approximately the same distance from the airport as is the proposed residential areas of Stanly Ranch. It was reasonable and logical for ALUC to base its findings on complaints from present residents that locating houses within 100 feet of the Zone where housing is prohibited and below climbing and full power flying patterns, that annoyance would result.

Flight patterns are inherently variable. A pilot with many years' experience testified that during the rainy season, traffic oftentimes must go directly over residential areas planned for Stanly Ranch. There can be one flight per minute by JAL, mostly during the day, but also during the night.

Avigation easements are not a guarantee of no complaints. Disclosure is not the preferred method of avoiding complaints; rather keeping sensitive areas noise-free is.

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Therefore, all petitioner has done is to show that ALUC might have reached another I decision, not that this one was unsupported by evidence. Problems of noise that might arise on 2 the downwind leg of the flight patterns are well documented by business owners, residents, and 3 pilots.

Petitioner's Reply to Response:

The Milton Road citizens' comments are irrelevant because they live in a different area, closer to the airport. The undisputed data is that the decibel level of the Stanly Ranch area will be 47-48, well below the designated compatibility level of 55-60. Only Commissioner Kangas's unsupported statement that full power and climbing take place over the Ranch is in the record. The real fact is that this would occur only 2.5% of the time.

ALUC argues that avigation easements won't stop complaints. This isn't what ALUC is 11 about. It may only look into "excessive noise and safety hazards." It has no right to think about future complaints. And notwithstanding, development is already prohibited in Zones A through D where these complaints would originate.

Ruling:

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ALUC was supported in finding that putting almost all the proposed development homes in Zone E rather than Zone F will increase the likelihood of complaints about noise. Many complaints have been received from Milton Road residents, and these homes are approximately the same distance as some of the Zone E houses that are close to Zone D.

Also, the finding that flight patterns are variable and may change in the future is not without support. To put houses where the Stanly Ranch Specific Plan directs means that the flight patterns could not change in the future. That result is clearly a restriction on airport development. Avigation easements are necessary, but not a guarantee that residents would not complain and restrict development of the airport.

The purposes of ALUC are to promote safety, to control development in the surrounding 25 area so that an airport may develop in the future, and to minimize interference with present and 26 future airport operations. Petitioner's goal here is to limit ALUC to merely considering whether 27 the present situation would probably be consistent. This is not the only purpose for ALUC's. 28 There is no reason why a Commissioner may not draw inferences from the evidence (e.g. that 29

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similarly situated folks dislike the results of airport operations and complain about it) and that it would be better to locate houses further away rather than closer to the airport.

The fact is that one of the common flight patterns passes over the development. (AR 012; 015; 017; 0218; 0222; 0241; 0439) The court concludes that this fact means that the Commissioners may permissibly draw the conclusion that development "should be clustered away from common flight patterns." (ALUP p. 3-8) This could mean that there should be less development in Zone E and more in Zone F.

The conclusion reached is at least a rational conclusion based on evidence of flight patterns, and within ALUC's decision-making powers. This finding is likewise supported by substantial evidence, and the petition should be denied.

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CITY FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE HOUSING NEED

Petitioner's Argument:

Petitioner argues strenuously that this finding is not legally required; and even if it was, there is sufficient evidence to support the City's need for more housing.

This finding would require the City to violate the California Aeronautics Law, by requiring the City to make a finding of need before submitting the project to ALUC. The City by law must submit the project, regardless of a finding of housing need.

The DEIR says that there will be a shortfall of 1104 low and very low income housing units by the year 2010. All housing must be within the Rural-Urban Limit line. The project is entirely within the Rural-Urban Limit line, and is one of the last areas available for housing within the Rural-Urban Limit line.

Respondent's Response:

The ALUP states that prevention of encroachment is the best way to avoid incompatible land use. However, where the "availability of land suitable for residential development is limited and community goals dictate the need for residential uses within an airport's traffic area, some form of buyer notification should be required."

Therefore ALUP requires a community need for housing for residential development under flight patterns, not a generalized need for development. Merely because Stanly Ranch is the largest undeveloped area within the Rural-Urban Limit line, doesn't mean that development

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must be allowed.

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Petitioner's Reply to Response:

The referral by the City of the Stanly Ranch project to ALUC takes place before the City 3 decides to allow the development. Therefore, ALUC's statement that no finding has been made 4 about housing need would necessarily preempt the City's debate about the issues. 5

At any rate, there is absolutely no factual support for the finding in the Administrative Record. The Stanly Ranch Specific Plan environmental documents detail the need for, and the distribution of types of housing.

Ruling:

The Napa County ALUP provides that the needs of the airport take precedence, unless the 10 community's need for housing is overriding. That is, encroachment is to be avoided unless the countervailing need for housing is such that buyer notification is the way to avoid conflict with the airport.

It appears to the court completely proper for ALUC to consider whether there had been any showing that the Stanly Ranch Specific Plan housing development would solve a community housing need such as to override the goal of prevention of encroachment. To find otherwise would be to decide that ALUC could not fulfill its mandate of preventing interference with airport operations unless countervailing considerations exist.

The court determines that this finding also was supported by substantial evidence, and the petition should be denied.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

Petitioner's Arguments:

Adjudicatory decisions (those involving a weighing of evidence and discretionary application of a statute or a standard) require due process-notice and opportunity to be heard. (U.S. Constitution, 5th and 14th Amendments; California Constitution Article I § 7; Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5) Even where the statute involved (e.g. an application for a lot split) does not mandate a hearing, because the decision is quasi-adjudicatory, Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5 requires a hearing with notice and opportunity to be heard.

Here, ALUC is depriving Stanly Ranch of a significant property interest, so procedural

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due process must be provided. The procedure here was deficient because it was not based on evidence in the record, the findings were articulated after public hearings had closed, and the ultimate determination was made without notice and opportunity to be heard.

ALUC based its decision on assertions by its Commissioners, unsupported by evidence, and after the close of public hearings, without notice to Stanly Ranch as to:

1. Altitude mandates in "congested areas"

2. Relative locations of commercial and residential areas

3. Problems with "uplighting"

4. Requirements for City findings of housing need

The staff report did not contain analysis of these issues, and found that the project was consistent with ALUP.

Respondent's Responses:

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Petitioner's failure to raise due process claims at the hearing constitutes a complete waiver of this argument. Petitioner never requested that the hearing be re-opened or continued so that it could present other evidence. *Hawthorne Savings and Loan Assoc. v. City of Signal Hill* (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 148, 156.

The "fair trial" provision of Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5 means a fair administrative hearing, not all the protections of the 14th Amendment due process clause. Petitioner does not have a cognizable property interest unless the administrative agency has no discretion to deny the project. Where the agency may approve or deny, petitioner has no entitlement to develop its property as it wishes. *Gardner v. Baltimore Mayor and City Council* (4th Cir. 1992) 969 F.2d 63, 68.

Even if 14th Amendment due process rules apply, petitioner received it through notice and opportunities to be heard. Petitioner's lawyer was present at the hearing, and submitted evidence on each occasion. Petitioner's lawyer was the last speaker at the last hearing. Petitioner knew what was being decided.

There is no requirement that petitioner be given notice of the intended decision prior to its announcement. Cases cited by petitioner concern termination of parental rights and denial of a sentencing option. Where a substantial liberty interest is at stake, the government must provide a

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pre-deprivation hearing.

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Cohan v. City of Thousand Oaks (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 547, cited by petitioner,
concerned a City Council sitting as an appeals board where the Council itself had appealed the
decision of the Planning Board. The court found that this created an appearance of impropriety, a
Brown Act violation for failing to announce the agenda item, and a violation of its own rule that
an appellant must identify the ground for the appeal. This deprived the property owner of notice.
Here, there were no such multiple violations by ALUC.

Petitioner does not cite to the record support for its assertion that the Commissioners made unsupported factual assertions after the close of public hearings. The objection is waived by failure to object at the time, and to request re-opening or presentation of more evidence.

Further, these comments were based on evidence of the Stanly Ranch Specific Plan and ALUP, and were proper conclusions. A Commissioner's personal views are permitted regarding community policy or concerns. See *Cohan*, *supra*.

English v. City of Long Beach (1950) 35 Cal.2d 155, cited by petitioner, does not apply here. In English, the Board heard evidence outside the public hearings and one Board member spoke to a personal doctor while considering the firing of a police officer. English and his lawyer were not present during the taking of this evidence. Here, no evidence was taken when petitioner's lawyer was absent, or outside the public hearings.

Petitioner has a valid administrative remedy, appeal to the City Council as was argued in the Demurrer. Petitioner has exercised that remedy and at least initially obtained an override of the ALUC finding of inconsistency.

Even if petitioner is right, the court should merely remand to ALUC for rehearing. *English, supra,* (remedy for denial of fair hearing is remand to administrative agency).

Petitioner's Reply to Response:

California v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260 laid out the considerations for how much process is due in an administrative hearing.

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- 1. The private interests that will be affected by the public decision
- 2. The risk of erroneous deprivation if not enough due process is allowed
- 3. The "dignitary" interest deprived by not allowing enough due process

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4. The governmental interest and the burden of providing more due process In this proceeding, petitioner Stanly Ranch has:

1. An immense private interest (to make a profit on its land)

- It has erroneously been deprived of this right by ALUC's refusal to consider the evidence if the City doesn't override. Now, Petitioner must face liability alone. The City did, of course, indicate their willingness to override ALUC in contemplation of submitting the entire project to vote of the electorate.
- 3. The Ranch's dignity is offended by not being informed of the basis of the decision until the Commissioners were deliberating.
- 4. ALUC should have the same interest as Stanly Ranch in a fair hearing and impartial decision.

<u>Ruling:</u>

The court hesitates to find waiver, as courts properly do unless the finding of waiver is clear or mandated by a procedural statute. In this action the court may not and so will not find that there was waiver.

The court concludes that appropriate due process was accorded petitioner. ALUC held hearings at which petitioner appeared, and made findings after the hearings. Petitioner made numerous arguments at numerous hearings. Administrative due process is not the same as judicial due process. *Pomona College v. Superior Court* (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1716.

The right to develop is not a property right. Petitioner skirts that troublesome issue by saying that ALUC's decision is an unconstitutional taking, well knowing that zoning and development rights have long been held not to be, unless all development is barred. Petitioner definitely does not have a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to its Stanly Ranch Specific Plan, since ALUC has the right to make a finding of inconsistency. *Gardner v. Baltimore Mayor and City Council* (4th Cir 1992) 969 F.2d 63, 68. Therefore, there is no deprivation of a property interest subject to 14th amendment due process rights.

The assertions made by the Commissioners have sufficient support in the record.

1. Altitude mandates are contained in government documents that are in the record.

2. The locations of housing and commercial areas are designated in the Stanly Ranch

	Specific Plan. The Handbook that an ALUC uses in making its decisions emphasizes		
	noise problems with residential areas. Aircraft can fly under 1000 feet when taking off		
	and landing, and there was sufficient evidence that such flights will occur over		
	4 residential areas of the project. (AR 0241; 0218)		
	3. A pilot noted Uplighting, and a Commissioner who has substantial flight experience		
	6 concluded that it might be a problem. This issue is also addressed in the Handbook.		
	4. The court has already commented on the City housing need issue.		
1	The court concludes that under this argument, petitioner was provided appropriate		
9	procedural due process, and the petition should be denied on this ground.		
10	JUDGMENT		
11			
12	above. Respondent shall recover their costs in this action. The court will execute herewith a		
13	form of [PROPOSED] JUDGMENT DENYING PETITIONER'S PREEMPTORY WRIT OF		
14	MANDAMUS earlier prepared by respondent.		
15	Dated: 22 July 1999.		
16	RICHARD A. BENNETT		
17	RICHARD A. BENNETT, Judge		
18	Superior Court for Napa County		
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